Governance ReviewNo. 31Epochs 615 to 62023 Feb 2026 to 25 Mar 2026
The ₳300M Cardano spending limit fails, opposed as too tight and as still too loose
The proposal to lower Cardano's treasury spending limit from ₳350M to ₳300M closed below the required majority. The no voters disagreed on why: Yoroi, EMURGO and the Eternl DRep Committee wanted to retain funding capacity, while Dave and hix_coffeepool wanted a lower limit still.
The ₳300M proposal would cut the agreed spending ceiling by ₳50M
Both proposals for the spending limit of epochs 613 to 713 start from the ₳306.9M the treasury took in during 2025, across epochs 532 to 604. The ₳350M ceiling agreed in the window before sets the limit at about 115% of that figure, and its document says the room above the inflows was included for the ₳50M stablecoin liquidity budget approved in 2025 and not yet drawn on. Net Change Limit of 300 Million ADA for Epochs 613 to 713 sets the limit slightly below the inflows and says it would supersede any limit previously agreed for the period. A request for the first withdrawal from the liquidity budget, Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1 for ₳800,000 to set up the legal entity and audit the contract the budget needs, was filed in epoch 617 while the lower ceiling was still being voted on.
Voting on the lower ceiling closed at the start of epoch 618. The tally was 118 yes votes, 42 no and 13 abstain. Yes votes carried ₳2.46B and the no votes ₳1.71B, but the yes side held 44.1% of DRep power, because abstaining power is left out and power that did not vote counts as no.
The vote on the ₳300M ceiling, in delegated ada
Bars show the votes cast, in delegated ada
Yoroi, EMURGO and the Eternl DRep Committee voted no to keep the room, Dave to cut it further
The three largest DReps on the no side wanted the room kept. Yoroi W₳llet wrote that reducing the ceiling “may be premature”, that discipline should come from alignment with the 2030 targets, “proposal-level scrutiny, and milestone-based controls rather than by tightening the structural ceiling itself”, and that in a lower ada price environment the same costs in dollars require more ada. EMURGO wrote that the limit “is a ceiling, not a spending mandate” and that tightening it “does not in itself improve spending quality or accountability”. The Eternl DRep Committee wrote that a new limit can always be voted on and that ₳350M for the same period was already in place. At epoch 620 those three held ₳1.28B in delegated power between them. AdaStat voted no for the same reason, that a higher limit “reduces the risk of rejecting strong proposals just because of an arbitrary limit”.
Some no votes wanted a lower figure than ₳300M. Dave wrote that ₳300M “is still excessive” and advocated ₳200M to ₳250M to force prioritisation. hix_coffeepool☕️ recommended ₳200M or less, because the outcome of the 2025 budget had not been reviewed. On the yes side, YUTA wrote that the ada price had fallen “by nearly 30%” since the ₳350M ceiling was proposed on 10 January 2026, which called for stricter budget priorities. The Cardano Foundation wrote that ₳300M “falls within our margin of acceptance” because it roughly matches the 2025 inflows and the ecosystem “ran a deficit” in the 2025 cycle, while still holding the ₳350M limit to be constitutionally valid, and it urged the committee to say whether a committee vote on a ceiling is needed at all.
A net change limit requires support from more than half of the active voting stake, a requirement the treasury guardrails set and a published account of this vote names. At 44.1% the lower ceiling did not reach it, so the ₳350M agreed for epochs 613 to 713 remains the limit in force, and the six committee yes votes on this proposal change nothing about that.
Delegation to DReps peaks at ₳5.87B in epoch 618, inside a flat stretch
At epoch 618 the power delegated to DReps stood at ₳5.87B, the highest reading since epoch 508. It is a small movement in a flat stretch rather than an event: ₳5.83B at epoch 615, ₳5.87B at 618, ₳5.83B again at 620.
The power delegated to DReps, epochs 595 to 620
In billions of ada, the two default options excluded
The largest decline listed is the Cardano Foundation DRep, down ₳56.7M from ₳188.0M to ₳131.3M between epochs 614 and 620, measured across the whole window and not at epoch 618.
Amaru is ratified, KtorZ abstains as one of its proposers
The treasury paid nothing in the six epochs, and its balance rose by ₳19.3M between the readings at epoch 615 and epoch 620, from ₳1.64B to ₳1.66B. Nothing had yet been drawn against the new spending period.
Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2026 was ratified at the start of epoch 620 with 70.9% of DRep power, on 136 yes votes to 16 no. The stored committee tally holds five yes votes and one abstention, one of the yes votes recorded during epoch 620, after the ratification boundary. The abstention was KtorZ, who wrote that he is one of the proposers and stepped aside over the apparent conflict of interest. The request asks ₳10.1M for a second year of work on Amaru, the independently built block producing node whose first ₳1.5M was the first payment ever made out of the treasury. The step from ₳1.5M to ₳10.1M is the difference between funding the scopes that nothing else covered and funding a full year of the project. The document prices that year at fifty cents per ada and counts January and February 2026 into it after the fact, because, it says, the request had been held back until a spending limit with room for it was in place. It promises a relay capable node in the first quarter and a block producing node by the middle of the year, and puts the money under the project’s own maintainer committee, paid out through a smart contract that can return unspent contingency to the treasury.
The Cardano Foundation wrote that the maintainers had returned “over 920,000 unspent ada” at the close of their 2025 budget, which “sets a benchmark for integrity”, and that their work had already uncovered bugs that could have affected the main network. YUTA wrote that in a bearish market treasury spending “must be evaluated with particular caution”, and that the node is “a structural security investment” all the same. The Eternl DRep Committee closed with three words, let them cook. The request was ratified inside this window and had not been paid at its close.
Five new requests
Five proposals arrived during the window and were still open at its close: three withdrawals asking for ₳57.7M together, Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect), filed in epoch 616, and Approve Cardano Foundation as New Managing Entity of Project Catalyst, filed in epoch 619. The largest withdrawal is ₳50M for Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund, filed in epoch 618 as the first tranche of an investment fund whose document sizes the long term plan at $80M or more, up to $75M of it from the treasury across three separately approved tranches, this first one included, over six to eight years. The other two came in epoch 617 with deadlines at the start of epoch 624: the ₳800,000 liquidity draw above, and Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs, ₳6.9M for twelve months of work on a block producing node written in Go, which its document places next to Amaru as a second independent implementation.
Across the six epochs DReps cast 709 votes, committee members 24 and pools 55, superseded votes included. The 788 votes include final votes from 180 DReps and 21 pools.
Decided in this window
| Action | Outcome | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Net Change Limit of 300 Million ADA for Epochs 613 to 713 | Closed 618 | 44.1% |
| Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2026 | Ratified 620 | 70.9% |
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect) | Voting ends at the start of epoch 623 | n/a |
| Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 624 | n/a |
| Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs | Voting ends at the start of epoch 624 | n/a |
| Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund | Voting ends at the start of epoch 625 | n/a |
| Approve Cardano Foundation as New Managing Entity of Project Catalyst | Voting ends at the start of epoch 626 | n/a |
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 615
- ₳5.83B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 620
- ₳5.83B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 788
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 180
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 615
- ₳1,642.5M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 620
- ₳1,661.8M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Stake pool shares on an information action are the share of stake behind yes votes.
- The ₳350M limit this proposal set itself against was decided in the window before this one and is not in the table. Its figure is read from the net change limit block of the data pack. That the proposal describes itself as superseding any earlier limit, and what each of the two ceilings was built on, is read from the documents the two proposals themselves carry.
- The delegation of the three largest DReps that voted no is their epoch 620 snapshot, not their weight at the time each vote was cast.
- The shares shown for the five actions open at the close are tallies read after the window closed, not readings as of epoch 620.
- Votes cast is every vote of epochs 615 to 620 across all three roles, superseded votes included.
Sources and further reading
20 sources, open the list
- Yoroi voted no on the lower ceiling, writing that reducing the limit at this stage may be premature, that spending discipline should come from alignment with the 2030 targets, proposal level scrutiny and milestone based controls rather than from tightening the structural ceiling, and that in a lower ada price environment the same costs require more ada. the rationale of Yoroi on the lower ceiling
- EMURGO voted no on the lower ceiling, writing that the limit is a ceiling and not a spending mandate, that tightening it does not in itself improve spending quality, and that a 17 month period at reduced purchasing power may constrain legitimate initiatives. the rationale of EMURGO on the lower ceiling
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted no on the lower ceiling, writing that the limit is an upper bound, that a new one can always be voted on, and that a ₳350M limit for the same period was already in place. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the lower ceiling
- YUTA voted yes on the lower ceiling, writing that limiting spending to below the previous year's inflow made sense, and that the ada price had fallen by nearly 30% since the ₳350M ceiling was proposed on 10 January 2026, so budget priorities should be reconsidered more strictly. the rationale of YUTA on the lower ceiling
- The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the lower ceiling, writing that the figure fell within its margin of acceptance because it roughly matches the 2025 inflows, that the ecosystem ran a deficit in the 2025 cycle, and that it still considered the ₳350M limit constitutionally valid while urging the committee to clarify whether a committee vote is needed on a ceiling at all. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the lower ceiling
- Dave voted no on the lower ceiling, writing that ₳300M was still excessive and advocating a limit of ₳200M to ₳250M to force prioritisation. the rationale of Dave on the lower ceiling
- hix_coffeepool voted no on the lower ceiling, writing that the outcome of the large 2025 budget had not been reviewed and recommending ₳200M or less. the rationale of hix_coffeepool on the lower ceiling
- AdaStat voted no on the lower ceiling, writing that each proposal should be judged on its own quality and that the higher limit of ₳350M reduces the risk of rejecting strong proposals because of an arbitrary limit. the rationale of AdaStat on the lower ceiling
- YUTA voted yes on the node withdrawal, writing that in a bearish market treasury spending must be evaluated with caution, but that the node is a structural security investment through implementation diversity. the rationale of YUTA on the node withdrawal
- The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the node withdrawal, writing that the team had returned over 920,000 unspent ada at the close of its 2025 budget, which sets a benchmark for integrity, and that its work had already uncovered bugs that could have affected the main network. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the node withdrawal
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the node withdrawal, writing that node diversity is a necessary building block for resilience, that the team had made great progress and shown transparent budget management, and closing with let them cook. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the node withdrawal
- KtorZ abstained on the node withdrawal as one of its proposers, citing an apparent conflict of interest. the rationale of KtorZ on the node withdrawal
- The treasury guardrails require a net change limit to be agreed by the DReps with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake, and a published account of this vote names that requirement for this proposal. a published account of the vote on the lower ceiling
- The withdrawal ratified here asks ₳10,142,000 for a second year of work on Amaru, the independently built block producing node, where the first request covered only the scopes that no other funding reached. the document behind the first node withdrawal
- The document behind the node withdrawal prices the year at fifty cents per ada, counts January and February 2026 into it after the fact, and says the request was held back because the spending limit then in force had no room for it. It promises a relay capable node in the first quarter and a block producing node by the middle of the year, with the money administered by the maintainer committee of the project through a smart contract that can return unspent contingency to the treasury. the document behind the node withdrawal
- The document behind the ₳350M ceiling explains the figure as about 115% of the treasury inflows of 2025, which it puts at ₳306.9M across epochs 532 to 604, and says the room above the inflows was included for the ₳50M stablecoin liquidity budget the DReps had approved in 2025 and nobody had yet drawn on. Its reference for that budget is the same budget action the first liquidity withdrawal names as its basis. the document behind the ₳350M ceiling
- The document behind the lower ceiling sets its ₳300M with reference to the treasury inflows of the previous year, the same ₳306.9M across epochs 532 to 604, and says it would supersede any earlier limit agreed for the same period. the document behind the lower ceiling
- The first liquidity withdrawal asks ₳800,000 to set up the legal entity and audit the smart contract needed to carry out the stablecoin liquidity budget, and names that budget action, which it says drew more than 67% support, as the basis of the request. the document behind the first liquidity withdrawal
- The investment fund proposal asks the community to vote only on a first tranche of ₳50M and describes the long term plan as a fund of at least eighty million dollars, seventy five million of which would come from the treasury if later tranches are approved by separate votes, over a term of six to eight years. the document behind the investment fund request
- The Go node request asks ₳6.9M for twelve months of engineering on a block producing node written in Go, and places itself next to Amaru as a second independent implementation. the document behind the Go node request