⚠ Preprod testnet

Governance ReviewNo. 30Epochs 612 to 6148 Feb 2026 to 23 Feb 2026

A new ₳350M Cardano spending period opens, and the cut to the committee minimum is dropped

DReps endorsed a new ₳350M spending limit for epochs 613 to 713, with no carryover of the previous period's unused allowance. A separate proposal to reduce the committee minimum from seven to five was dropped when another parameter change invalidated the reference it depended on.

₳2.97M
of the old ₳350M ceiling left unused when its period closed at the end of epoch 612, which does not carry over
99.1%
of the old ceiling consumed across 40 paid withdrawals before its period closed
86.45%
of counted DRep power behind the memory increase, with 57.16% of counted pool stake, both above their bars
19.19%
of counted DRep power behind lowering the minimum committee size, a proposal the ledger dropped before its deadline

The 532 to 612 period closes with ₳2.97M unused, and a ₳350M ceiling opens for 613 to 713

The spending period that began at epoch 532 closed at the end of epoch 612, eight epochs later than originally planned, an extension the review of epochs 603 to 605 explains. It finished with ₳347.0M of its ₳350M ceiling drawn across 40 paid withdrawals, 99.1% of what it allowed, leaving ₳2.97M unused.

That remainder is not a credit. A ceiling caps what may leave the treasury inside its own period, and when the period ends the unused part ends with it. Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713), endorsed at the start of epoch 612 while the old period still had that epoch to run, with 61.3% of DRep power, opens a fresh ₳350M for epochs 613 to 713, and the new period started at zero. Four of the seven committee members voted yes and three did not vote.

The spending period of epochs 532 to 612 at its close

In millions of ada, 40 withdrawals against a ₳350M ceiling

PaidLeft unused
Paid: ₳347.0M₳347.0MPaidLeft unused: ₳3.0MLeft unusedThe ceiling: ₳350.0M
The period used 99.1% of what it allowed. The ₳2.97M left over is not added to the new period, which begins at zero under its own ₳350M.

Its document takes the treasury’s inflows of 2025, ₳306.9M across epochs 532 to 604, and sets the ceiling at about 115% of them. The part above the inflows has a named purpose: the ₳50M stablecoin liquidity budget the DReps had approved in 2025, which nobody had yet drawn on when the ceiling was submitted on behalf of the budget committee at Intersect. The Cardano Foundation read the figure the same way, as “carrying over” the authority for that unspent budget, and voted yes because a valid limit “is a constitutional prerequisite for processing any treasury withdrawals”: without one, funding “would be blocked after Epoch 612”. YUTA voted yes while writing that it did not understand “the logic behind the 350M ada limit”, and that a limit set below the inflows over the period would not “destroy financial discipline”. The Eternl DRep Committee wrote that it is an upper limit and “can be changed any time by submitting a new proposal”.

hix_coffeepool☕️ wrote that the outcome of the large 2025 budget “hasn’t reviewed yet” and recommended ₳200M or less. A competing proposal for a lower ceiling was already on chain: Net Change Limit of 300 Million ADA for Epochs 613 to 713, a ceiling of ₳300M for the same epochs, was still open at the close with a deadline at the start of epoch 618. Its document starts from the same ₳306.9M of inflows and sets the limit at ₳300M, below them, which would leave ₳50M less room for withdrawals in total, the higher ceiling having been sized by its proposers to hold the ₳50M liquidity budget. The review of epochs 615 to 620 has the result.

The memory increase takes effect at epoch 614 with 86.5% of DRep power

Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2) was ratified at the start of epoch 613 and took effect at epoch 614, with 86.5% of DRep power and 57.2% of counted pool stake behind it, both above their bars, and six committee members in favour.

Every Cardano transaction carries a budget for how much work a smart contract inside it may do, measured in memory units, and there is a second budget for a whole block. A transaction over the first limit is rejected, and a block cannot include scripts beyond the second. This change raises the per transaction limit from 14,000,000 units to 16,500,000 and the per block limit from 62,000,000 to 72,000,000, and touches nothing else. This first step raises the limits by 17.9% per transaction and 16.1% per block, the most the guardrails recommend while keeping four maximally sized transactions in one block, and a second linked action would bring both increases to 25% of the original limits. It also explains why it is called part one of two: a guardrail requires a change of this kind to be split across two linked actions.

The Eternl DRep Committee called it an “easy decision”, because two committees had signed off and monitoring would be in place. YUTA voted yes with a reservation: it had found no sign of critical drawbacks in the forum discussions and committee minutes it reviewed, but “surveys indicate that there is a non-negligible number of developers who believe that this change should not be implemented”, and it would keep watching.

The proposal to cut the committee minimum from 7 to 5 is dropped at epoch 614, not expired

Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5 left the governance queue at epoch 614, and its outcome is neither ratified nor expired but dropped. That is a third possibility this series has not met before, and it means a proposal can lose without anybody voting it down.

A parameter change has to name the parameter change that came before it. That pointer is how the ledger keeps parameter changes in order. This proposal, filed in epoch 612, named the Plutus cost model change the review of epochs 526 to 528 covers, the most recent enacted parameter change at the time it was written. When the memory increase was enacted at the start of epoch 614, that was no longer true. The pointer was stale, the proposal could no longer be applied to the chain it claimed to extend, and the ledger removed it.

The Cardano Foundation voted yes while acknowledging “a technical conflict” with another parameter change, and spelled the conflict out: because every parameter change must reference the last ratified one, and the memory increase had already passed, “the current proposal will be technically invalidated”. It voted yes anyway, for a minimum that keeps the committee functional if two members resign. YUTA voted yes for the same reason, writing that with the committee at exactly its minimum size a single resignation would leave it “below the minimum threshold” and “non-functional”, urgent security updates included. SASA_nagamaru_ながまる did not see the committee “in a state of critical dysfunction” and wrote that a smaller minimum “may increase the relative influence of individual members” and, over time, the risk of centralisation. Army of Spies wrote that it wants “more decentralization, not less”.

When it was dropped it had 19.2% of DRep power against a 75% bar, and its voting would otherwise have run until the start of epoch 619. The attempt to lower the committee minimum followed a committee resignation covered in the review of epochs 597 to 599, which had shown what a committee at exactly its minimum does when someone leaves. A second attempt at the same change is in the review of epochs 639 to 641.

The next hard fork is to be named after Max van Rossem, at 83.6% of DRep power

Name Protocol Version 11 hard fork - van Rossem closed at the start of epoch 613 with 83.6% of DRep power behind it and 86 pool votes in favour, none against.

It asks for the next hard fork to carry the name of Max van Rossem, a community contributor who had recently died. Its text sets out why: he was a member and co lead of the working group that ran the first election of a fully elected constitutional committee, he represented his national community as a delegate at the constitutional convention that produced the constitution, and he was among the driving forces behind one of its articles. The Cardano Foundation wrote that Max “was a much-loved member of the Cardano community” and integral to that first election. Cardano has named upgrades after contributors who died before, and the edition on the Plomin rename covers the last time this series reported one.

Also in the window

A treasury withdrawal without a title in the record, titled Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1 in its own document, the ₳500,000 first payment against the stablecoin liquidity budget the new ceiling was sized to hold, expired at the start of epoch 614 after all six voting committee members found it unconstitutional, with 63.55% of DRep power behind it, itself short of the 67% a withdrawal needs. KtorZ, one of the six, called it “unfortunate timing for this proposal which arrives alongside a constitutional change”: its rationale document sat at a malleable address rather than a content addressed one, and its delivery period and refund conditions were not clearly stated. A second version with those items in it is in the review of epochs 615 to 620.

Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2026 was filed in epoch 614, a ₳10.14M request for a second year of work on the alternative node, with a deadline at the start of epoch 621. Its document says the request had been held back because the limit then in force had no room for it, which is why it arrived one epoch after the new period opened. A fresh ₳350M was untouched at the close, with the first request against it already filed.

The window recorded 800 votes, 441 from DReps, 346 from pools and 13 from committee members, with final votes from 179 distinct DReps and 295 pools. Pools turned out for the memory change, which needs their stake as well as the DReps. The treasury reading rose ₳8.6M to ₳1.64B.

Decided in this window

Open at the close of the window

ActionAmountStatusDRep yes
Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2026₳10.1MVoting ends at the start of epoch 621n/a
Net Change Limit of 300 Million ADA for Epochs 613 to 713Voting ends at the start of epoch 618n/a

n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 612
₳5.82B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 614
₳5.84B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
800
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
179
Treasury, at the start of epoch 612
₳1,629.9M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 614
₳1,638.6M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Pool shares are yes stake over counted pool stake, and a pool that does not vote is not automatically counted against: a pool whose reward account is delegated to one of the predefined options votes that way by default, which this edition does not reconstruct.
  • The new ceiling is ₳350M for epochs 613 to 713, as the proposal that set it states. The site registry carries ₳500M for the same period, which is the effect of a later action raising it, and an edition about this window uses the figure that was endorsed here.
  • The old period's unused ₳2.97M is not extra room in the new period. A ceiling caps withdrawals inside its own period and nothing carries over.
  • That the dropped proposal lost its place because the other parameter change was enacted first is read from its own predecessor reference, which names the parameter change enacted at epoch 526 rather than the one enacted at epoch 613, not from the coincidence of timing.
  • The record holds two different pool abstention counts for the memory increase at different reads and does not reconcile them. Neither is used here for anything but the stake share, which both agree on.
  • Neither proposal open at the close is decided here, so the record holds no share for them from inside this window. Votes cast is every vote of epochs 612 to 614 across all three roles, superseded votes included, and per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options.

Sources and further reading

19 sources, open the list
  • YUTA voted yes on the new ceiling, writing that it did not understand the logic behind the ₳350M figure, but that since the limit is set below the inflow over the period it would not destroy financial discipline. the rationale of YUTA on the new ceiling
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the new ceiling, writing that a valid limit is a constitutional prerequisite for any withdrawal and that without one funding would be blocked after epoch 612, that the period moves the budget cycle to mid year, and that the figure carries over the authority for the approved but unspent stablecoin liquidity budget. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the new ceiling
  • The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the new ceiling, writing that a limit is needed to approve withdrawals, that it is an upper limit, and that it can be changed at any time by a new proposal. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the new ceiling
  • hix_coffeepool voted no on the new ceiling, writing that the outcome of the large 2025 budget had not been reviewed yet and recommending a limit of ₳200M or less. the rationale of hix_coffeepool on the new ceiling
  • YUTA voted yes on the memory increase, writing that it had found no indication of critical drawbacks in forum discussions and committee minutes, but that surveys showed a non negligible number of developers who believe the change should not be implemented, and that it would keep monitoring. the rationale of YUTA on the memory increase
  • The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the memory increase with the words easy decision, because two committees had signed off on it and monitoring would be in place. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the memory increase
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the committee size proposal, writing that it supported the change while acknowledging a technical conflict with another parameter change, that a minimum of five keeps the committee functional if two members resign, and that because every parameter change must reference the last ratified one the proposal would be technically invalidated by the memory increase that had already passed. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the committee size proposal
  • YUTA voted yes on the committee size proposal, writing that the committee was at exactly its minimum size, so that a single resignation would make it non functional and block even urgent security updates. the rationale of YUTA on the committee size proposal
  • SASA voted no on the committee size proposal, writing that it did not perceive the committee to be in critical dysfunction, that lowering the minimum from seven to five may increase the relative influence of individual members and heighten the risk of centralisation, and that continuity should not be bought by reducing decentralisation safeguards. the rationale of SASA on the committee size proposal
  • Army of Spies voted no on the committee size proposal, writing that it wanted more decentralisation, not less, and that reducing the seats was not the answer. the rationale of Army of Spies on the committee size proposal
  • KtorZ voted no on the untitled withdrawal, writing that it arrived at an unfortunate time alongside a constitutional change, that its rationale document was hosted at a malleable address rather than content addressed, and that its delivery period and refund conditions were not clearly stated. the rationale of KtorZ on the untitled withdrawal
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the naming signal, writing that Max was a much loved member of the community and integral to the election of the first fully elected committee. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the naming signal
  • The ceiling endorsed here is ₳350M for a period beginning at the start of epoch 613 and ending at the end of epoch 713, and its text says the figure holds unless a later ceiling supersedes it. It explains the figure as about 115% of the treasury inflows of 2025, which it puts at ₳306.9M across epochs 532 to 604, and says the amount above the inflows was chosen to make room for the ₳50M stablecoin liquidity budget the DReps had approved in 2025 and nobody had yet drawn on. It was submitted on behalf of the budget committee at Intersect. the document behind the new ceiling
  • The lower ceiling proposed for the same period sets its ₳300M with reference to the treasury inflows of the previous year, the same ₳306.9M across epochs 532 to 604, and says it would supersede any earlier limit agreed for the period. the document behind the lower ceiling
  • The memory increase raises the Plutus script memory limit per transaction from 14,000,000 units to 16,500,000 and per block from 62,000,000 to 72,000,000, and changes no other parameter or cost model entry. This first step raises the limits by 17.9% and 16.1%, the most the guardrails recommend while keeping four maximally sized transactions in one block, and the text says a guardrail requires the full 25% increase to be split across two linked governance actions, of which this is the first. the document behind the memory increase
  • The node withdrawal calls itself the second treasury request of the project, after a budget and a withdrawal in 2025, and says it was held back because the spending limit then in force had no room for it. It asks ₳10.14M for a year of work priced at fifty cents per ada, January and February 2026 included after the fact, with a relay capable node due in the first quarter and a block producing node by the middle of the year, administered directly by the maintainer committee of the project through a smart contract that can return unspent contingency to the treasury. the document behind the node withdrawal
  • The dropped proposal would have lowered the minimum committee size from 7 to 5, to improve operational resilience while keeping constitutional safeguards, and its on chain reference names an older parameter change as its predecessor, the cost model update enacted five windows into this series. the document behind the committee size proposal
  • The naming signal asks for the next hard fork to carry the name of Max van Rossem, a community contributor who had recently died, and records that he served as a member and co lead of the working group that ran the first election of a fully elected constitutional committee, represented a national community as a delegate at the constitutional convention, and was one of the driving forces behind an article of the constitution. It places the request in the tradition of naming upgrades after contributors who have died. the document behind the naming signal
  • The withdrawal the record holds no title for asks for ₳500,000 as the first payment against the stablecoin liquidity budget, and a published committee rationale found it unconstitutional for stating no circumstances of refund and not disclosing earlier treasury receipts. the published rationale of one committee no vote